BEE Partner, South Africa Economy Watch

The endogenous determination of the interest rate

In a boom, banks will lend more and will seek to create new deposits or issue additional notes. To support these activities, they will have to attract additional reserves. This will lead them to bid up interest rates, as they seek to attract idle reserves from one another and from hoards. In a slump, they will issue less and lend less, and will seek to shed reserves, lowering interest rates. In other words, while long-term average rates are determined by costs and competition, current interest rates reflect the balance of supply and demand in the market. They move pro-cyclically.

This is illustrated by a simple model. On the one hand, the rate of interest (in relation to the rate of profit), is likely to affect investment inversely, and investment, in turn, will have an impact on prices and employment. Changes in prices and employment will call for changes in reserves. Read the rest of this entry »

In its earliest and simplest forms, the gold standard meant that the money in circulation, including the money the government minted, consisted of gold coins. When the US officially joined the gold standard in 1879, the value of the dollar was set as equal to the value of 23.22 fine grains of gold, where 480 fine grains made a fine troy ounce. This was equivalent to $20.67 per ounce.

Under the gold standard, the constraint on the creation of bank money posed by reserves is critical. Bank money consists of notes issued as claims to real money, that is, to gold or silver coins, money with intrinsic value. But at any time, most of the public would prefer to use the more convenient paper money, provided they are confident that they can convert the (intrinsically worthless) paper to gold at a moment’s notice. For this purpose, reserves are kept in proportion to the note issue. Read the rest of this entry »

A ‘transformational growth’ perspective (Nell, 1998a) would suggest that these principles are connected in an evolutionary pattern: as technology developed, production and employment took on new forms, and came to require different kinds of financing (Nell, 1998b). To keep pace, the monetary system also had to adapt and develop in new ways.

This took place in several stages. In the first instance, as transactions became more complex, metallic money proved inconvenient. Paper claims to gold could be used more easily, and came to replace gold. But bankers noticed very early that a given supply of gold could support a larger amount of circulating paper, since only a fraction would be presented for conversion at any given time. Convertible paper based on a fractional reserve, however, is fiduciary money. It is based on the trust the public has in the banks. Read the rest of this entry »

Reserves

The deposits and currency created by the Federal Reserve are the reserves of the modern system. It would seem that if the Fed could control the amount of these reserves, it could thereby limit the ability of banks to lend, and thus control their ability to create deposits. By controlling reserves, the Fed could control the total quantity of money. As we saw earlier, real reserves did constrain banks. It has seemed plausible, and monetarists everywhere have believed, that modern, nominal reserves could provide a similar constraint. But central banks all around the world, including the Federal Reserve, have tried to exercise such control, most recently in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and, in virtually every case, their attempts have failed. Read the rest of this entry »

Now let us look at modern money, which is not anchored in gold or precious metals, and consider how money that is purely a matter of convention or fiat obtains and keeps its value. In the older economy, money was anchored to metal that had ‘intrinsic value.’ Such money is an asset to its possessor, but it is no one’s liability. This connection is broken in modern systems in which money has no intrinsic value. It is an asset to its possessor, and a liability to its issuer. Between these, we have a system in which paper money and bank deposits are loosely tied to intrinsic value by being convertible into bullion, plate or coins. Such money is also a liability to its issuer. The implications of the change from money of intrinsic value to modern money are striking. Read the rest of this entry »

The government budget tends to move counter-cyclically. In a slump, incomes will be reduced and spending curtailed, so tax collections will fall, but welfare and related spending to support the unemployed will tend to rise. Other government budget items are likely to be unaffected. Hence, the overall effect will be to throw the budget into deficit. By contrast, in a boom, tax collections will rise and welfare spending will tend to decline, so a surplus will tend to emerge. In short, in an economy with demand-based cyclical fluctuations, the central government budget will tend to move in a counter-cyclical fashion.

Now consider the monetary implications of deficits and surpluses. A deficit arises when the government spends more than it receives in taxes; this means a net increase in money in the system. Such money will appear as excess reserves in the banking system. If allowed to remain, it will drive down interest rates. Looked at another way, it will drive up security prices. A surplus is just the opposite; it arises when the government spends less than it takes in, and it creates a reserve deficiency, tending to force interest rates up. Read the rest of this entry »

In the older economy, the monetary system did provide a constraint, and this constraint helped stabilize the economy; changes in the value of reserves worked in conjunction with the price mechanism. By contrast, the modern monetary system offers no constraint, and, in fact, inflations and asset price booms are self-financing, since price rises increase the value of collateral, on the one hand, and raise the value of bank capital on the other. The modern monetary system also allows for a creative use of the central government’s budget. The shift in money from real to nominal, following the changes in technology, has brought a new role for the government. The government budget is both much larger and plays a stabilizing role in the way it affects the economy. Read the rest of this entry »

This rate has to be the target for which policy makers aim. If they try to reduce unemployment below this rate, they may temporarily succeed, but inflation will ultimately take off. If they raise unemployment above this rate, inflation will decline, but it will not stay lower, or even continue to fall, unless inflationary expectations are lowered. For this to happen, unemployment must stay high, but unnaturally high unemployment, coupled with lower than normal inflation, will lead employers to believe that real wages are exceptionally low. So they will begin to hire labor, and unemployment will move back to its natural level. Inflationary expectations are therefore unlikely to be lowered. Read the rest of this entry »

The idea behind the Phillips Curve is that higher inflation is associated with lower unemployment, and vice versa. Intuitively, this seems plausible enough. The stronger the economy, the more business is booming, the more jobs there will be. So we can expect the rate of unemployment to be lower. Indeed, it may fall to a point where shortages of various labor skills begin to emerge. In general, the more the economy is booming, the more likely there are to be shortages and inflationary pressures. By the same token, in a slump, excess labor and excess capacity will reduce inflationary pressures, and may even lead in some areas to price cutting. Read the rest of this entry »

Suppose, for example, that the GDP growth rate exceeds the interest rate by five percentage points. Then the steady-state deficit-to-GDP ratio will be 5 per cent of the debt-to-GDP ratio. If the debt-to-GDP ratio is at, for example, 60 per cent, then the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio can be permanently maintained at 3 per cent. Incidentally, these figures are the same as those stipulated in the European Union Maastricht Treaty as ‘convergence criteria’ for debt and deficit. Note that if the GDP growth rate exceeds the interest rate by five percentage points, then no less than one-fifth of the public sector in our ’small government‘ example, and one-tenth of the ‘big government‘ example, can be permanently financed by allowing the government debt to grow continuously. Taxpayers would be relieved accordingly. Read the rest of this entry »

This stagnation tendency, the growing savings gap, has often been viewedas a problem. But why should one look at it that way? Isn’t the gap really a big resource? Should it not be encouraged? For the bigger the gap, the greater the scope for deficit financing of public spending. Indeed, the graver the stagnationist tendencies of the private sector, the lower the taxes can go, and the greater the scope for public borrowing and a growing debt. Instead of encouraging private spending as a remedy for stagnation, should we not promote private saving to widen the savings gap? For by so doing, we could deficit finance all the more, and enjoy the supply-side benefits of reduced taxation. Read the rest of this entry »

A necessary practical condition is that the government share of GDP be limited, that is — in the case of European welfare states — be cut back. This need not involve any reductions of the volume and quality of services provided by the government sector. If aggregate supply is relatively elastic with respect to the level of taxation, then tax cuts may provide for a great expansion of the private sector. A vigorously growing private sector will tend to reduce the share of the public sector in the economy, a reduction that might render unnecessary any actual cutbacks of the real size of government. Read the rest of this entry »

ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF PSE

One of the chief limitations of the PSE approach is that PSE subsidies may bemisdirected when used by state or local governments to pay employees already hired, or workers who would have been hired in the absence of the program. This kind of ‘fiscal substitution’ appears inherent in a PSE approach because it functions as a disguised form of revenue sharing.

A study prepared under the auspices of the National Planning Association estimated a fiscal substitution effect of 0.46 after one year. Subsequent studies produced conflicting results, but verified that the fiscal-substitution effect can be substantial (Bergman and Bennett, 1977). The greater the substitution of federal funds for state and local funds, the less effectively PSE will operate as an employment program. Read the rest of this entry »

Proponents of functional finance are committed to the principle that government’s power to tax, spend, borrow and manage its debt can and should be used as an instrument for achieving the goals sanctioned by a democratic voting process for the macroeconomy. The premise of functional finance is quite explicitly that a dynamic capitalistic economy is inherently unstable, so that unemployment and price instabilities periodically impose economic pain on the economy as a whole, which impacts most severely on labor markets. Wages and salaries comprise two-thirds of earned income; both J.M. Keynes, and subsequently Laurence Klein and Richard Kosabud, have shown the ratio of the wage relative to the profit share to be historically constant in national income (Keynes, 1939; Klein and Kosabud, 1961). Read the rest of this entry »

In Australia, despite the paradigm shift in macroeconomics from Keynesian demand management to the monetarist supply-side approach, empirical evidence still supported the use of expansionary fiscal and monetary policy and public sector job creation (for example, Mitchell, 1987a, 1987b, 1994, 1996; Mitchell et al., 1995). The solutions proposed, however, relied heavily on income policy guidelines and were not, in retrospect, comprehensive enough. Further, the stimulus that would be forthcoming was not conceived to be adequately focused to support environmental sustainability, a goal usually ignored in orthodox macroeconomics. In this context, the Job Guarantee reflects work that was conceived when this author was a fourth-year student at the University of Melbourne in the late 1970s. Read the rest of this entry »

The application of functional finance to the operation of the labor market in the form of the payment of wage subsidies to employers to encourage the hiring of disadvantaged workers is a means for altering the mix of employment in their favor while also improving the inflation/unemployment trade-off. One proposal, which related specifically to teenage workers, suggested giving all teenagers vouchers that can be used either for schooling or to subsidize employers who hire them (Feldstein, 1973). This proposal has not been translated into policy. However, under the now phased-out Concentrated Employment Program (CEP), employers were reimbursed for the costs of job training to encourage them to hire workers they would otherwise not consider. Reimbursement of training costs incurred by firms that locate plants in or near slum areas is provided for under the Jobs Opportunities in the Business Sector (JOBS) program. Read the rest of this entry »

In the face of wage—price pressures, the Job Guarantee approach maintains inflation control by choking aggregate demand and inducing slack in the non- buffer stock sector. As the slack does not reveal itself as unemployment, the Job Guarantee may be referred to as a ‘loose’ full employment. This leads to the definition of a new concept, the NAIBER, which, in the buffer stock economy, replaces the NAIRU/MRU as an inflation control mechanism. The BER is the ratio of buffer stock employment to total employment.

As the BER rises, due to an increase in interest rates and/or a fiscal tightening, resources are transferred from the inflating non-buffer stock sector into the buffer stock sector at the fixed buffer stock wage. Read the rest of this entry »

What would happen if the Job Guarantee were introduced to solve the problem of unemployment in this economy? For simplicity of argument, we assume the Job Guarantee wage is set at the bottom of the private sector wage structure although not low enough to enforce poverty on full-time workers. If there were poverty level wages being paid in Sector B, then there would be pressure on Sector B employers to restructure their jobs in order to maintain a workforce. The Job Guarantee wage sets a floor in the economy’s cost structure for given productivity levels. The dynamics of the economy change significantly. The elimination of all but wait unemployment in Sector A and frictional unemployment does not distort the relative wage structure so that the wage—wage pressures that were prominent in the upturn in the NAIRU economy are now reduced. But the rising demand softens the product market, and demand for labor rises in Sector A. The Job Guarantee introduces no new problems faced by employers who wish to hire labor to meet higher sales levels. They must pay the going rate, which is still preferable to appropriately skilled workers than the Job Guarantee wage level. The rising demand per se does not invoke inflationary pressures as firms increase capacity utilization to meet higher sales volumes. Read the rest of this entry »

In this section we focus on inflation control and show that the Job Guarantee, able to simultaneously generate full employment and price stability, is superior to the current NAIRU approach, which uses unemployment to maintain inflation control. Broadly, there are three options available to an economy that desires price stability. First, as in the NAIRU approach, it can use unemployment as a tool to suppress price pressures. Second, it can introduce a Job Guarantee and use movements in the Buffer Employment Ratio (BER) to control inflation. Third, it can introduce the Job Guarantee policy and augment it with an incomes policy. We do not consider this third option.

The Role of Unemployment in Inflation Control

The OECD experience of the 1990s shows that high and prolonged unemployment eventually results in low inflation (Mitchell, 1996). There are several observationally equivalent theoretical explanations for the inflation—unemployment trade-off. Read the rest of this entry »

William Vickrey (1996: 10) argued, ‘The “deficit” is not an economic sin but an economic necessity. Its most important function is to be the means whereby purchasing power not spent on consumption, nor recycled into income by the private creation of net capital, is recycled into purchasing power by government borrowing and spending. Purchasing power not so recycled becomes non-purchase, non-sales, non-production and unemployment.’ In an endogenous money world, there can be no crowding out unless the monetary authority stops lending.

The recent Asian financial troubles and IMF intervention have once again given credence to the view that increasing levels of debt will eventually lead to lenders refusing to take up further public borrowing. Usually this is cast in terms of countries with low levels of capital that have major private debt denominated in a foreign currency used to finance imports. Crises occur when the export revenue, which services the debt, falls for one reason or another. But none of these countries would have any trouble issuing debt in its own currency. Read the rest of this entry »