BEE Partner, South Africa Economy Watch

The economy and poverty remain, in our view, the principal obstacles to future stability in South Africa. As noted, growth is insufficient to meet population needs, and the controversial GEAR policies have to a considerable extent removed the state from the direct provision of economic resources to the poor in terms of redistribution, and have instead placed this critical role in the purview of “the market.” It remains to be seen how well this substitutes for direct state interventions. The failure to address poverty, crime, the AIDS crisis, and public discontent over access to basic human needs reveals that South Africa’s highly vaunted democracy is fragile in “substantive” terms (Friedman 1999).

If the economy is South Africa’s Achilles’ heel, however, there are many other areas of concern in the body politic. By substantial majorities, South Africans of all races profess an interest in forgetting about the past, although whites are more likely to want to “just move on” than blacks. While this is in one sense an encouraging phenomenon, the now many intensive studies of the TRC and its aftermath may suggest otherwise. Indeed, many recent analyses suggest that the wounds of apartheid are not yet healed and that, in many ways, the TRC, despite its enormous efforts and considerable goodwill, proved to be little more than a palliative in the end (Wilson 2001; Graybill 2002). Evidence from within the region itself tells us that it is far more difficult to simply “forgive and forget,” as Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe pledged in 1980. Such instructions, whether well meaning or cynical, are particularly challenging to follow if the bulk of the populace lacks the material basis to move forward, let alone the psychological one (Minow 1998; Chua 2003). Ominously, it is not impossible to foresee an “antimarket backlash” against the ANC’s embrace of economic liberalism in general, and whites in particular, if the economy and general living standards do not improve markedly (Chua 2003). The Zimbabwe example, however cynical and hypocritical Mugabe’s manipulations of race have been, is simply too proximate to ignore. “Reconciliation” is inherently fragile where the inequalities of the past persist and are so visible.

Procedural democracy, too, stands at a crossroads. The regularization of elections and the institutionalization of the Independent Electoral Commission appear to have been substantially achieved. Indeed, the establishment of procedures and improvements in the conduct of elections and respect for their results indicate that “South Africa has traveled quite far along the road to democratic consolidation” (Lodge 1999, 210). Conversely, the concentration of power in the ANC and the party’s increasing centralization of authority are matters of concern, as is the corresponding erosion of federalism. The ANC now dominates virtually every level of government in South Africa. The absence of a credible opposition party. or parties, is also problematic “when a governing party sees less and less need to respond to public opinion because it is assured of re-election” (Afrobarometer 2003b). The constitutional changes enacted in 2003 to allow aisle-crossing without a compulsory by-election served to further limit contestation almost immediately. The lack of perceived progress on numerous economic and social issues, crime and AIDS prominent among them, coupled with ANC’s unbridled dominance, may have grave implications for participation. This is not yet endemic in South Africa, but the lack of genuine parliamentary constituencies means that people are increasingly disconnected from the institutions of government (Mattes 2002). The primacy of the constitution and the role of the Constitutional Court (institutions that a short time ago seemed set to ensure the preservation of’ constitutionalism in South Africa) have been threatened by the emergence of an ANC supermajority that can change the constitution unilaterally.

Many factors augur positively for South Africa, and the achievements of both its government and society in the decade since the end of minority rule cannot be diminished. Nonetheless, the country faces challenges to democracy of both procedural nature and substantive nature. Moreover, as a state of single-party dominance for the foreseeable future, South Africa must internalize the positive lessons of the Botswana model, while avoiding the pitfalls of the Zimbabwe model of single-party dominance.

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